## 1AC

#### This year’s topic invites us to reflect on the meaning of presidential actions—who, what, where, when, why, but also HOW, through what WAYS OF THINKING did we allow for the authorities and powers of the presidency so unrestrained that we can only grasp their expression in fiction.

#### The war camp is not just an isolated act of war—it represents not only the mass executions by Germany in World War II or the parallel detention of thousands of Asian-American persons by the U.S. government, but stands for the entire governmental paradigm of modernity. The idea of isolating spaces as inside or outside the law, tying certain bodies to varying legal rights based on their spatial location, is a crucial component of the larger framework of disciplinary authority and exceptional violence which characterizes contemporary governmental practice.

Agamben 2000 (Giorgio Agamben, professor of philosophy at the College International de Philosophie in Paris, Means Without End: Notes on Politics, 2000, p. 40-41)

One ought to reflect on the paradoxical status of the camp as space of exception: the camp is a piece of terri­tory that is placed outside the normal juridical order; for all that, however, it is not simply an external space. Ac­cording to the etymological meaning of the term *excep­tion (ex-capere),* what is being excluded in the camp is captured outside, that is, it is included by virtue of its very exclusion. Thus, what is being captured under the rule of law is first of all the very state of exception. In other words, if sovereign power is founded on the ability to decide on the state of exception, the camp is the struc­ture in which the state of exception is permanently real­ized. Hannah Arendt observed once that what comes to light in the camps is the principle that supports totali­tarian domination and that common sense stubbornly refuses to admit to, namely, the principle according to which anything is possible. It is only because the camps constitute a space of exception—a space in which the law is completely suspended—that everything is truly possible in them. If one does not understand this par­ticular political-juridical structure of the camps, whose vocation is precisely to realize permanently the exception, the incredible events that took place in them remain en­tirely unintelligible. The people who entered the camp moved about in a zone of indistinction between the out­side and the inside, the exception and the rule, the licit and the illicit, in which every juridical protection had dis­appeared; moreover, if they were Jews, they had already been deprived of citizenship rights by the Nuremberg Laws and were later completely denationalized at the moment of the “final solution.” Inasmuch as its inhabitants have been stripped of every political status and reduced com­pletely to naked life, the camp is also the most absolute biopo­litical space that has ever been realized —a space in which power confronts nothing other than pure biological life with­out any mediation. The camp is the paradigm itself of po­litical space at the point in which politics becomes bio­politics and the homo sacer becomes indistinguishable from the citizen. The correct question regarding the hor­rors committed in the camps, therefore, is not the ques­tion that asks hypocritically how it could have been possible to commit such atrocious horrors against other human beings; it would be more honest, and above all more useful, to investigate carefully how—that is, thanks to what juridical procedures and political devices—hu­man beings could have been so completely deprived of their rights and prerogatives to the point that commit­ting any act toward them would no longer appear as a crime (at this point, in fact, truly anything had become possible).

#### The U.S. response to security threats is identical in form to the National Socialist reaction against otherness—the passage of the NDAA signifies a panicked response to a borderless and faceless enemy, internalizing security protocols as the very precondition for existence.

Kamalnath 2013 (Anthea, Law Graduate at University College London, “United States of Exeption,” <http://antheakamalnath.wordpress.com/tag/agamben/>, 30 April 2013)CJQ

The only explanation for the sheer lack of discourse, let alone intelligent discourse, in relation to the topic of the Obama administration’s gross expansion of executive powers and its support of unconstitutional provisions of the National Defense Authorization Act 2012 (NDAA) is that we are in a “state of exception”, characterized by anomie at best and idiocy at worst. Cicero said, “There can be war without tumult, but no tumult without war.” President Obama signed the NDAA into law Dec 2011. The NDAA is not a simple extension of the Patriot Act. The NDAA allows for indefinite detention of any person suspected of terrorism or posing a threat to the executive, both American citizen and foreign national, without probable cause and with zero promise of due process. Although the NDAA secures the end of Guantanamo Bay as a detention center, it allows the executive to literally sign off on death warrants – shoot-to kill lists of suspected terrorists, some American, some under 18. In the 1920s, German legal theorist Carl Schmitt coined the term “state of exception”, a moment in government when there is a “suspesion of the entire existing judicial order”. Following the September 11th attacks, the subsequent Patriot Act of 2001 and Guantanamo Bay , Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben elaborated on this historical phenomenon with his books “Homo Sacer” and “The State of Exception.” I read the latter in college and it changed the way I saw the world. For Agamben (and the tradition that produced him Carl Schmitt, Walter Benjamin, Jacques Derrida), a “state of exception” is neither internal nor external to the juridicial order, and the problem of defining it concerns a threshold, or a zone of indifference, where inside and outside do not exclude each other but rather blur with each other. It introduces a zone of anomie into the law in order to make the effective regulation of the real possible. Agamben argues that this “state of exception” was already codified in Roman law; the Roman iustitium, literally “the suspension of the law”, was an archetypal state of exception. “Iustititium” gave the Roman Senate expansive powers in the face of threats to the Republic. Iustitium was declared following the death of the sovereign, a legal manifestation of grief through suspension of the order: Durkheim’s anomie. Grief is arguably dehumanizing; a state of exception is the reversal of the human to the non-human, the fate of enemy combatants captured and detained in Guantanamo Bay with no legal identity and no legal rights. The National Defense Authorization Act is the final act of the “state of exception”: the no man’s land of Guantanamao Bay has been done away with, only to be brought home. The NDAA FY 2012 allowed the executive to kill an American citizen without due process, without charging him with a crime, and to hide behind the shield of executive powers. And he did. At any previous time in American history, a summary execution by the executive without due process would have been considered cold-blooded murder and an act of tyranny. Yet no one blinked an eye. This indifference is not a normal condition for society; it is a pathological psychological state, a social “state of exception”. I will never understand the vocal enthusiasm of those who claim they are proud of our President, the NDAA undoes every decent thing President Obama has achieved in office. The politcians will pontificate, the lawyers will legislate, but the people should always pay attention.

#### But the NDAA was not passed in isolation—for decades, FEMA has colluded with the US Armed Forces to plan and execute a massive national securitization of life. The Army and FEMA created the Civilian Inmate Labor Program to create the very prison camps which are the materialization of violent sovereignty—the entire nation is now a concentration camp.

Bourbaki 2013 (Nicole, blogger, “FEMA’s Mass Fatality Planning,” <http://financearmageddon.blogspot.com/2013/05/femas-mass-fatality-planning.html>)CJQ

Since the Reagan administration, REX-84 U.S. Civilian Inmate Labor program has been drawn up, implemented, and expanded in many ways. The military and police have been increasingly training together. The military has been running operations like "Urban Warrior" fully-armed in suburbia. 800+ FEMA detention centers (concentration camps) have already been built all over the United States and Halliburton's engineering subsidiary KBR is busy building more. These camps are complete with biometric scanners, barbed wire facing inwards, gas lines and furnaces, heli-pads, watchtowers, and security cameras. The few journalists who have filmed and reported on these have been observed by black helicopters and even approached and questioned by secret servicemen (see Google or you tube videos of "FEMA camps"). "The Civilian Inmate Labor Program was conducted in secret at US military bases from 1989 to 1996. This nightmare program was recently declassified. If Civilian Inmate Labor Programs are so wonderful, why did the Army keep them secret for over seven years? There are thousands of pages of documents on the Army's website detailing the massive scope of this program, much of which is still secret. Many of the documents are contradictory. For example, on the same page it will say that the Army is not allowed to house and use State inmate labor, and, in the next paragraph will say that they have been housing and using State inmate labor ...For years, we warned people about FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency). The federal documents have been around for decades and include round-up plans and concentration camps. People used to laugh at us when we said this in December of 1999. Then came Seattle. FEMA housed and protected government-placed 'anarchist' provocateurs, but put five hundred peaceful demonstrators in a FEMA camp on the outskirts of town. FEMA used the old Sand Point naval brig to detain hundreds of American citizens.

#### And, these camps aren’t far-away or on remote off-shore locations; they are in every state and every territory. In Washington alone there are at least four capable of holdings hundreds of thousands of prisoners and have been used in the past to illegally imprison activists during the Seattle 1999 WTO protests.

Gibson 2013 (Dave, blogger, “Find the FEMA Camp Nearest You,” <http://intellihub.com/2013/06/13/find-the-fema-camp-nearest-you/>)CJQ

WASHINGTON Seattle/Tacoma – SeaTac Airport: fully operational federal transfer center

Okanogan County – Borders Canada and is a site for a massive concentration camp capable of holding hundreds of thousands of people for slave labor. This is probably one of the locations that will be used to hold hard core patriots who will be held captive for the rest of their lives.

 Sand Point Naval Station – Seattle – FEMA detention center used actively during the 1999 WTO protests to classify prisoners.

Ft. Lewis / McChord AFB – near Tacoma – This is one of several sites that may be used to ship prisoners overseas for slave labor.

#### Biopolitics now collapses into the project of an unending genocide on deviant bodies in the name of survival. Not only the camp, but massive international wars become possible when sovereignty reacts to national emergencies by disposing of those bodies who refuse to conform—Nuclear extermination is the final expression of FEMA ideology.

Foucault 1978 (Michel Foucault, professor of philosophy at the college de france, The History Of Sexuality: An Introduction, Volume 1, 1978, pg. 136-137)

Since the classical age the West has undergone a very profound transformation of these mechanisms of power. “Deduction” has tended to be no longer the major form of power but merely one element among others, working to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on generating forces, mak­ing them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them. There has been a parallel shift in the right of death, or at least a tendency to align itself with the exigencies of a life-adminis­tering power and to define itself accordingly. This death that was based on the right of the sovereign is now manifested as simply the reverse of the right of the social body to ensure, maintain, or develop its life. Yet wars were never as bloody as they have been since the nineteenth century, and all things being equal, never before did regimes visit such holocausts on their own populations. But this formidable power of death—and this is perhaps what accounts for part of its force and the cynicism with which it has so greatly expanded its limits—now presents itself as the counterpart of a power that exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavors to adminis­ter, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations. Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire popula­tions are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed. And through a turn that closes the circle, as the technology of wars has caused them to tend increasingly toward all-out destruction, the decision that initiates them and the one that terminates them are in fact increasingly informed by the naked question of survival. The atomic situation is now at the end point of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual’s con­tinued existence. The principle underlying the tactics of bat­tle—that one has to be capable of killing in order to go on living—has become the principle that defines the strategy of states. But the existence in question is no longer the juridical existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population. If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.

#### THUS THE PLAN: The war powers of the President of the United States should be substantially restricted and Army Regulation 210-35 stricken from law.

#### The radical contestation of the plan matters. The plan forces the state to confront the question of FEMA camps existing which exposes the mechanism by which governmenttality fuses with biopolitical regimes to internalize hierarchies of control. This is based on the constant articulation of human subjectivities as stable, subordinated to the apolitical calculations of the state apparatus which remains unconcerned with the resistance it makes inevitable.

Cooper 10 [Brent, Alumnus of the London School of Economics, Sociology, Studies Political Science and International Relations at the University of British Columbia, Towards a Theory of Conspiracy: Analyzing Hidden Power in Globalization Process, Published in Knowledge and power in International Relations, June 1st 2010 AMB]

Investigating conspiracies within the higher levels of the state apparatus poses a unique challenge. In Sovereignty and the UFO, Alexander Wendt and Raymond Duvall make a compelling case for the threat certain taboos pose to governmentality – UFOs in this case. Governmentality, a concept from Michel Foucault, is the organized government practices (mentalities, rationalities, and techniques) directed at the management of populations and their territories.36 In the article, Wendt and Duvall argue that the investigation of UFOs threatens the anthropomorphic sovereignty of states, and is therefore ignored. I contend that this approach can be transposed onto questions of localized conspiracies pertaining to issues of national security. An example is the activation of the aforementioned state secrets privilege, but this is not so much a „taboo‟ as it is an explicit restriction by the state. An academic taboo, more specifically, is generally enforced by stigmatization and ostracism; examples of which include the study of covert operations and of state terror, both of which I discuss later. Wendt explains that science strives for an apolitical and objective account of reality, but is self-limited by its own methodology which produces an ever evolving, contestable body of knowledge, that precludes absolute “Truth.”37 On the other hand, the state seeks a regime of truth that its citizens will adhere to. In this case, Wendt argues, the state values stability and normalization as part of its standard of knowledge, over a scientific (albeit uncertain) criteria of truth.38 For the modern liberal state, power depends on legitimacy and knowledge rather than force to govern its populations, while the latter is a latent feature. However, when a regime of governmentality comes under threat, the sovereign authority reveals its truth power source: the capacity to suspend norms and laws if it sees fit - as Carl Schmitt put it, to "decide the exception."39 As Wendt says with UFOs, I argue with conspiracies that the authorities are not “hiding The Truth” about them, but rather “they cannot ask the question”; 40 the party in power, or more generally the state, is threatened by its own investigation.‡ And since we cannot know for sure, to reject the possibility is to possibly reject a true explanation; a Type II error in statistics.41 Wendt insists that the metaphysics of modern rule are so resilient that we should not underrate the challenges of resistance; those who challenge the status quo in this respect face career hurdles and put their reputation at risk.42 Therefore, the sensible position to take is to be agnostic about CT because atheism and belief are not epistemically justified.4

#### And, identically to how the camp imposes geo-spatial boundaries on human bodies who are placed outside of the law, liberal political theory places boundaries on thought which ensures that political agents arrive at certain predetermined conclusions. Conspiracizing about political discipline lays the basis for a thinking-otherwise which undoes stale political socialization.

Britach 2003 (Bratich, Jack Z., Jeremy Packer, and Cameron McCarthy. "Making Politics Reasonable: Conspiracism, Subjectification, and Governing through Styles of Thought." Foucault, Cultural Studies, and Governmentality. Albany: State University of New York, 2003. 67-101. Print. AMB)

Acknowledging the density and importance of thought does not situate it as the only or even primary mechanism of coordination in governmental cultural strategies. Nor is it to erase the crucial role of social, political, and economic determinations in shaping the forms of experience characteristic of this conjuncture (more on this later). And it is certainly not a call (as is so often the case of critical thinkers) for "more thought" as an antidote to the "unthinking" practices of everyday life. This quantification of thought ignores the way liberal governing has predicated itself on this activity. Rather, it is to argue that thought, because it has been made governmental under liberalism, is an important point of contestation. As we shall see, liberal arts of governing have persisted in large measure due to an ethos of self-critique, to the harnessing and deployment of thought as a political rationality and a strategic process of subjectification. The task, then, is to analyze the ways thought has been governmentalized, as a way of making this rationality contingent, thus opening up a thinking-otherwise (and a becoming-free-otherwise) . And, as I will argue later, this contingency is not just due to its historicity; it is located in the ambivalence of the very practice of governance that requires thought in order to persevere. With this in mind, I will first examine how Foucault defines thought as a methodological issue, in terms of its relation to practice, action, and ideas, in order to give thought its own specificity. Second, I will explore how, following the Enlightenment ethos of self-criticism, thought is taken up by liberal governance. In the third section, I take up Judith Butler's account of the power/subjectification dynamic as a "trope of the turn" in order to complicate the way thought can be turned on itsel£ Finally, I will use the recent problematizations of conspiracy theories in American political thought as an example of how, in advanced liberalism, thought is still required to be folded as a target of modification. Overall, the goal of this essay is to show the importance of thought in understanding how the present is governed specifically the liberal styles of thought that organizes consent and dissent. How are the contemporary problematizations of "conspiracism" attempts to secure consent (to a regime of truth) and modify dissent? How do neoliberal political rationalities attempt to organize styles of thought in the name of freedom? In the case of conspiracy theories (problematized as "the paranoid style," or "conspiracism") different styles of thought are marked, I argue, by the degree of skepticism that composes them. The very skepticism that defines liberal political rationality also marks its vulnerability when it comes to "paranoid" styles of thought. This continuing controversy over conspiracy theories foregrounds the implications of a "reasonable politics" in thought and action.

#### The question of knowledge production is the most important political question to ask—the way that we THINK about THOUGHT directly constructs what thoughts it is possible to think. Without reflecting on the nature of our thoughts new political projects get swamped by existing institutions. It’s not the exact content of our political conspiracies which matters, but rather it’s a question of formulating a way of thinking that allows for thought to expand beyond the confines of existing power.

Britach 2003 (Bratich, Jack Z., Jeremy Packer, and Cameron McCarthy. "Making Politics Reasonable: Conspiracism, Subjectification, and Governing through Styles of Thought." Foucault, Cultural Studies, and Governmentality. Albany: State University of New York, 2003. 67-101. Print. AMB)

As evidenced in this epigraph, assessing how the present is governed entails more than a sociological description of various mechanisms, techniques, and institutions of governance, that is, more than the "actually existing" (Gordon, 1991 , p. 8). According to Nikolas Rose (1999), studies of governmentality "entail a work of thought on the present that is itself, inescapably, a work of thought" (p. 58). A scandalous statement for proponents of a kind of materialism that would relegate thought to the thin atmosphere of ideology and phenomenological consciousness, if not idealism. But in order to proceed on the effectivity of these kinds of studies, according to Rose, it is necessary to discard the last vestiges of those nineteenth-century philosophical disputes between materialism and idealism . . . they have done much to constrain our ways of understanding the materiality of ideas, and to recognize the embeddedness of thought in the most prosaic aspects of social and economic life." (1999, p. 58). That is, thought cannot merely be reduced to the diluted and auxiliary domain of ideological representation, or even to discourse. Foucault is delineating a different status for thought-practices, one that has a more productive and active force to it, not just the reactive force almost always accorded to"ideology" given the idealism/materialism binary. As Gilles Deleuze stated it when interviewed about Foucault's work, "thinking's a capacity, a capacity to set forces in play . . . [where forces mean] acting upon actions . . . . That's thought as strategy" ( 1 986, p. 95). Foucault often described his own work as an "ontology of the present" which includes the "different ways of thinking about who we are" (Dean, 1 996, p. 2 1 0). According to Mitchell Dean ( 1 996), an ontology of the present" seeks to define the conditions in which we are led to problematize what we are, what we can and should do, and the world in which we find ourselves"(p. 225). It asks, "how is reason exercised?" (Rabinow, 1 997, xxiv). In otherwords, an ontology of the present requires thought on thought. This conception of thought has very practical, concrete effects for political action, since "as soon as one can no longer think things as one formerly thought them, transformation becomes both very urgent, very difficult, and quite possible" (Foucault, 1988b, p. 155). Or, as Rose (1 999) puts it, "showing the role of thought in holding [contingent arrangements] together . . . also show[s] that thought has a part to play in contesting them" (p. 59). More than just being a condition for change, thought is also imperative to prevent a return or doubling of the institutions and practices targeted for transformation. Without "the work of thought upon itself . . . whatever the project of reform, we know that it will be swamped, digested by modes of behavior and institutions that will always be the same" (Foucault, 1988b, p. 156).1

#### Reflecting on conspiracies offers a chance to expose gaps in official discourses and demand a more rigorous epistemological framework. It’s not an irrational opposition to official truth narratives but is rather a highly informed skepticism which can be used strategically to contest violent power relations.

Sapountzls & Condor 2013 (Sapountzls, Antonis, and Susan Condor. "Conspiracy Accounts as Intergroup Theories: Challenging Dominant Understandings of Social Power and Political Legitimacy."Political Psychology 2013th ser. XX.XX (2013): n. pag. Print. AMB)

Social identity theory’s concern for the reality of social groups and for collective action as a¶ mechanism of social change has led theorists generally to question assumptions about the irrationality¶ of group-based social cognition and action (see Spears, 2010) or the necessarily pathological¶ nature of social conflict (e.g., Oakes, 2001). In particular, social identity theorists have taken issue¶ with conventional assumptions concerning the irrationality of social stereotyping, arguing that¶ categorical social perception can both reflect social reality (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994) and be¶ strategically used as a rational means by which to promote social and political change (Haslam,¶ Turner, Oakes, Reynolds, & Doosje, 2002; Oakes, Reynolds, Haslam, & Turner, 1999; Reicher,¶ Hopkins, & Condor, 1997b; Reynolds, Oakes, Haslam, Nolan, & Dolnik, 2000).¶ We suggest that a similar line of argument could be applied to conspiracy theorizing. In fact,¶ many of the properties that academic commentators often regard as typical features of conspiracy¶ accounting correspond with assumptions about the social world adopted in formal social identity¶ theoretical perspectives on intergroup relations.1 For example, conspiracy theorizing tends to involve¶ dualistic, categorical accounts of political structures and processes. Similarly, as Subašic´, Reynolds,¶ and Turner (2008) have noted, social identity theorists often represent intergroup relations “in¶ dualistic terms: in-group versus out-group, dominant versus subordinate, powerful versus powerless,¶ disadvantaged versus privileged” (p. 330). Conspiracy narratives generally involve teleological¶ reasoning, presenting political and events as the outcome of direct design on the part of a powerful¶ antagonist. Again, this same kind of perspective can often be found in social identity theoretical¶ accounts of intergroup conflict (Condor, 1996a).

#### By exposing and deconstructing the collusion of FEMA and the military to transform the political space of the United States into a massive death camp, we position ourselves as external to the knowledge production of the sovereign orchestrators of FEMA—we can expose the gap at the heart of disciplinary power.

Dykes 10 [Dykes, Aaron. "Bombshell: FEMA Camps Confirmed." Infowars Bombshell FEMA Camps Confirmed Comments. Infowars, 10 Nov. 2010. Web. 28 Aug. 2013. <http://www.infowars.com/bombshell-fema-camps-confirmed/>.]

Former Gov. Jesse Ventura and his [crew at Conspiracy Theory](http://www.trutv.com/shows/conspiracy_theory/index.html) have blown the FEMA camp issue wide open in a truly groundbreaking episode from the program’s second season on TruTV. The “Police State” episode proves once and for all that the feds have trained to take on American citizens, planned for riots and disasters and made preparations to maintain order at any cost. Tune in this Friday, Nov. 12 at 10 PM Eastern/ 9 PM Central and leave the denial at the door.¶ This powerful episode is the largest and most in-depth investigation into FEMA camps to date– and it is scheduled to air on television. Radio host and filmmaker Alex Jones returns to the series yet again, as the team takes you to confirmed on-the-ground facilities, confronts the legislators who authorized FEMA camps and breaks down the full-scale technologically-integrated police state that includes Fusion Centers, FEMA, the Department of Homeland Security and more.¶ At one of many real and verified FEMA locations, Jesse Ventura and Alex Jones approach a “Residential Center” run by Homeland Security in central Texas where they find locked doors, double-fences and escape warnings around the entire perimeter. Further inside the facility, they witness a playground complex, swings and slides for children. The crew walks up to the front door and attempts to get some answers. But the officials refuse to either confirm or deny the facility’s purpose, including whether or not American citizens are being held inside. However, [our past investigations into this facility](http://www.infowars.com/articles/ps/concentration_camps_tx_prison_camp_future_american_gulag.htm) reveal that it has confined both [children and adults](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TxYxTly-yo8), including immigrants, refugee seekers and American citizens.¶ Despite hundreds of government documents identifying emergency and contingency plans, including plans to deal with [mass fatalities](http://www.homelandsecurity.ms.gov/calendar.html), [insurrection](http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CBsQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.infowars.com%2Fus-troops-in-homeland-%25E2%2580%259Ccrowd-control%25E2%2580%259D-patrols-from-october-1st%2F&rct=j&q=site%3Ainfowars.com%20insurrection&ei=EVrbTMSnFsOAlAfD4YGNCQ&usg=AFQjCNFuF2Xqggayi-vNYlF_vGpalcc-vg&sig2=yCrpU8RxwNEMlb3kiN50dQ&cad=rja), [internment](http://www.infowars.com/h-r-645-and-the-fema-concentration-camps/) and [quarantines](http://www.infowars.com/planning-the-h1n1-flu-pandemic-body-bags-mass-graves-quarantine-orders/), Ventura and his team repeatedly encounter outrageous denial and avoidance by officials at every level. The mainstream media have avoided and downplayed these on-the-record plans for FEMA Camps and Homeland Security Emergency Facilities for years. Clearly, it is not meant to be a public relations talking point, and it is no surprise that members of Congress, including those who wrote the bill to create FEMA camps in America, are reluctant to discuss the matter.¶ So, Jesse Ventura, former Mayor and Governor, descends upon Washington to confront two important figures behind [H.R. 645, the National Emergency Centers Establishment Act](http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h111-645). Despite going through official channels, Ventura finds that [Jim Gerlach (P-Pennsylvania)](http://gerlach.house.gov/) repeatedly “ducks” TV cameras and refuses to answer questions about [H.R. 645](http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h111-645).¶ Another Congressman who co-sponsored the bill starkly adm

#### But this doesn’t mean the question of spillover or solvency is relevant. The sovereign will always attempt to neutralize and internalize the production of any knowledge—we can’t ever claim to solve beyond the space of this round. We merely ask to abandon sovereignty in the face of its excessive violence.

Kent 6/25 [Kent, Clark. "Proof FEMA Camps Are Real." Hang the Bankers. Hang the Bankers, 25 June 2013. Web. 28 Aug. 2013. <http://www.hangthebankers.com/proof-fema-camps-are-real/>.]

Prior to the introduction of the bill, [U.S. troops returning from Iraq were assigned to conduct “homeland patrols”](http://www.infowars.com/us-troops-in-homeland-%E2%80%9Ccrowd-control%E2%80%9D-patrols-from-october-1st/) and part of that assignment was to deal with “civil unrest and crowd control.”¶ In the years leading up to FEMA concentration camp legislation, the government prepared for the eventuality of civil and political unrest. Rex 84, Operation Garden Plot, Operation Cable Splicer, and a flurry of executive orders issued over the years have established the framework for concentration camps.¶ Add to this the Pentagon’s [Civilian Inmate Labor Program](http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/r210_35.pdf), provided by Army Regulation 210-35, that establishes labor programs and prison camps on Army installations. It was issued in 2005, well before the current legislation of its predecessor. Signaling that the effort was not sidelined or mothballed, in January 2006, Kellogg, Brown and Root reported that they had received a contract from the Department of Homeland Security to expand these internment camps.¶ The government is determined to keep information about its FEMA concentration camps as secret as possible. This was demonstrated in December, 2010, when TruTV inexplicably [pulled an episode](http://www.infowars.com/police-state-episode-of-hit-ventura-show-covering-concentration-camps-pulled-from-air/) of Jesse Ventura’s [Conspiracy Theory](http://www.trutv.com/shows/conspiracy_theory/index.html) dealing with FEMA camps and fusion centers.¶ It is not certain H.R.390 will make it out of committee and become law. But its reintroduction earlier this year reveals a sincere desire on the part of the establishment to put a martial law detention infrastructure in place, especially now as the economy continues is danse macabre and the prospect of revolution grows within the United States.

## 2AC

### Case

#### Epistemic commitments determine ontological outlooks and predictive results—prior critique is necessary to stave off banal instrumentality and institutional bias

Stanley ’12 Liam Stanley, “Rethinking the Definition and Role of Ontology in Political Science,” Politics, Vol. 32 (2), p. 93-99, 2012

The literature says very little directly on the subject of how ontological assumptions emerge (Hay, 2005, p. 41). In many ways, this is unsurprising, particularly because it is not possible to conduct such an analysis without first committing to a series of ontological and epistemological assumptions (which I, of course, must also make in the remainder of the article). This inescapable irony is noted, but should not prevent the endeavour altogether because otherwise such discussions would not even be possible. Nevertheless, in regard to how political scientists make ontological assumptions some preliminary answers can be gathered from reading the literature from in between the lines. While the literature often rightly claims that ontological dualisms are perennial problematiques with no solution (Hay, 2006, p. 82; Jenkins, 2005, p. 6), they also tend somewhat paradoxically to offer conceptual refinements to these unsolvable dichotomies: e.g. structure–agency (McAnulla, 2002), material– ideational (e.g. Marsh, 2009), mind–body (e.g. Jenkins, 2005). So, the question becomes, if ontological dualisms cannot be solved then why do political scientists seek to offer increasingly complex conceptualisations? It is presumably because such problematiques allow political scientists to reflect on their own assumptions, as well as the assumptions of others, and avoid making the simplistic structuralist or intentionalist mistakes of yesteryear. Such simplistic underpinnings should indeed be critiqued on the basis of unrealistically limiting the potential for human agency or failing to consider how structures favour certain actors and strategies. But the value of incrementally more complex conceptualisations is rarely justified through this. Furthermore, in tandem with the ideal-type of the directional dependence, this aspect of the literature also implies that ontological assumptions should emerge from engagement with philosophically oriented literature. Yet there is little reflection on whether this ideal-type accurately reflects academic practice and, more importantly, whether this would have any implications for foundations of their arguments. A second reading of the directional dependence model could also imply that ontological assumptions sometimes derive from epistemological decisions (Hay, 2006, p. 92). This is why the directional dependence model outlined earlier is important, because it demonstrates how seemingly innocuous epistemological or methodological decisions can influence assumptions about social reality. If some ontological assumptions are inextricably tied up with epistemological decisions, then the next step should involve the analysis of the process that, in part, gives rise to epistemological assumptions. This section aims to do just that. Epistemological decisions can influence or generate ontological assumptions. Colin Hay (Hay, 2006, p. 92) has shown the adverse affects of searching for generalisable knowledge (an epistemological decision) on the ontological assumptions and resulting explanations of rational choice theory. Yet, the extent of epistemological decision-making extends beyond the understandable ambition to theorize politics. It is sometimes influenced by academic norms emerging from the discipline as well as regulatory and funding bodies. One possible criticism of the literature on ontology is that it is irrelevant to the majority of political scientists who are driven by a ‘mundane instrumentality’ in which ‘what counts is what works’ (Bale, 2006, p. 102). Yet, this mundane instrumentality often manifests itself in the form of epistemological decisions, which may then influence ontological assumptions. Other researchers have made similar arguments, albeit not directly. For instance, Alan Bryman (2007) argues that the quantitative–qualitative ‘paradigm wars’ have been superseded by a certain ontological and epistemological pragmatism in which philosophical reflection is rendered obsolete in the pursuit of further funding and publications. When interviewing a n\\umber of leading social scientists Bryman (2007, p. 17) found that: ‘when asked about how far epistemological and ontological issues concerned them, most interviewees depicted themselves as pragmatists who felt it necessary to put aside such issues to secure funding for their research interests and to publish their findings’. Meanwhile, Clare Donovan’s (2005) analysis starts from the observation that nonpolitical scientists, who often impose inappropriate regulation in adjudicating the strength of research, regulate the discipline. The consequence, for Donovan, is the rise of a ‘slave social science’ in which positivism, the epistemological approach most associated with natural science, becomes dominant despite, perhaps, the misgivings some may have over its ontological ramifications. This suggests that ontological assumptions do not necessarily emerge from conscious deliberation with solutions to philosophical dualisms but are inextricably linked to a number of factors including the (perceived) epistemological biases of regulatory and funding bodies.

#### Biopower disad--Dismissing warrants as conspiracy theory is a violent discourse that constitutes who gets to speak and when

Hustin and Orr 07 [Husting, Ginna, and Martin Orr. "Dangerous Machinery: "Conspiracy Theorist" as a Transpersonal Strategy of Exclusion." *Symbolic Interaction* 30.2 (2007): 127-50. Print. AMB]

¶ An apt description of the start of the twenty-first century, if we update the war¶ and replace the word “liberalism.” Again, or still, deepening global inequalities¶ are paramount. The United States has become a culture of fear characterized by¶ free-floating anxiety, unease, and uncertainty, and new mechanisms of exclusion¶ have appeared in public discourse by which critical questions and claims are symbolically¶ delegitimized. This article traced one such mechanism in news and academic¶ discourse: the phrase *conspiracy theory*. In our data, the charge “conspiracy¶ theory” is a reframing device that neutralizes questions about power and motive¶ while turning the force of challenges back onto their speakers, rendering them unfit¶ public interlocutors. Indeed, those who question uses of power increasingly feel¶ compelled to disclaim “I’m not a conspiracy theorist, but . . .” Such a squeezing of¶ what can be said and done constitutes a form of discursive violence: thus do public¶ accounts become less and less critical and “political.” Our examination of the uses¶ of “conspiracy theorist” in public discourse contributes to and departs from the traditional¶ macro focus of literature on framing as schemata of interpretation that precede¶ discourse or as large-scale strategic moves on the part of social movements or¶ the media. Instead, we refocus on concrete instances of a micro-reframing device or¶ mechanism that attempt to freeze the ongoing negotiation of meaning through¶ claims. This device allows its user to “go meta,” rendering claims questionable or¶ unworthy of consideration on their own terms.¶ ¶ We suggest that a whole host of similar devices can be examined. Recent argument¶ over “uncivil discourse” and social decay seem more like new mechanisms of¶ social control than indicators of social decay in the populace. Like *conspiracy theorist*,¶ the label may also serve to set some issues, claims, and concerns outside the¶ symbolic boundary of “reasonable” deliberation and contestation.¶ Variants of the label conspiracy theorist become dangerous. The mechanism allows¶ those who use it to sidestep sound scholarly and journalistic practice, avoiding¶ the examination of evidence, often in favor of one of the most important errors in¶ logic and rhetoric—the ad hominem attack. While contest, claim, and counterclaim¶ are vital to public discourse, we must recognize that “democracy is a fragile and delicate¶ thing” (Denzin 2004) and mechanisms that define the limits of the sayable¶ must continually be challenged. We call on scholars and journalists, then, to continue¶ to develop a language for systematically tracking and diminishing such dangerous¶ machinery. We are not conspiracy theorists, but we believe that this machinery¶ weakens public spaces

#### You perform what we critique. You only frame out conspiracies which critique the government or you view as subversive which is a bad epistemology and kills public engagement

Pigden 7[professor of philosophy at the University of Otago, New Zealand and is the editor of Russell on Ethics (2007, Charles, “Conspiracy Theories and the Conventional Wisdom”, Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 4.2, 219-232, Project Muse) AMB]

So what do Blair and the pundits mean, when they state or imply that conspiracy theories ought not to be believed? Not that theories that posit conspiracies ought not to be believed, since they themselves are prepared to trumpet theories of precisely this kind. But if not this, then what? Perhaps "a conspiracy theory" is a theory that not only posits a conspiracy, but also meets some further condition X; for example, a conspiracy theory that contradicts the official view, and suggests evil deeds on the part of government officials or government agencies. The idea is that we are rationally required not to believe theories like that, though it may be is all right to believe in conspiracy theories so long as they are consistent with received opinion, or don't involve wrong-doing by government officials. But this modified principle is not much better than its predecessor. It is true that one of the conspiracy theories on which British foreign policy relied comes out as believable according to this principle. We can believe without irrationality that the events of 9/11 were due to a conspiracy on the part of Al Qaeda, since Al Qaeda is not a government agency. But what about the other two? Here we hit a problem. In Iraq the theory that Saddam was in cahoots with Al Qaeda was both inconsistent with the official view and posited evil deeds on the part of the Head of State. Thus in Iraq it was a conspiracy theory in the revised sense. Not so in Britain. Thus it was permissible to believe it in Britain but rationally wrong to believe it in Iraq. The same goes for the third conspiracy theory, that Saddam had successfully conspired to acquire WMDs. An epistemic principle that forbids a theory [End Page 228] in Baghdad but allows it in London leaves something to be desired even if it saves Tony Blair from the threat of pragmatic inconsistency. The conventional wisdom has metamorphosed into the claim that we should not believe or investigate conspiracy theories involving evil plots by government agents if this contradicts official opinion. But this can be given a relativistic or an absolute reading: either that you should not believe theories that depict evil conspiracies involving your own government that are inconsistent with the official view in your own country, or that you should not believe theories that depict evil conspiracies involving any government and that are inconsistent with official opinion anywhere. On the relativistic reading, this principle permits some people to believe theories that it forbids to others, though those who are forbidden to believe may have better evidence for the theory than those who are allowed to accept it. If people all around you are being disappeared by Death Squads and you are tempted (despite the President's denials) to suspect government complicity, the revised epistemic principle insists that you resist this temptation, even though people on the other side of the world, who don't have access to your evidence, are quite at liberty to believe it! The strategy might not be historically disastrous, since you would be allowed to believe in conspiracy theories about the dark doings of previous governments, so long as they were consistent with current opinion. But in many countries it would render political events unintelligible, since in many countries evil conspiracies on the part of government members dominate the political scene. And in rendering the populace politically blind the strategy would render them politically impotent. You can't even begin to solve a problem if you are duty-bound to ignore it.

#### Epistemology disad--Rejecting conspiracy theories destroys education and history as an academic discipline

Pigden 7[professor of philosophy at the University of Otago, New Zealand and is the editor of Russell on Ethics (2007, Charles, “Conspiracy Theories and the Conventional Wisdom”, Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 4.2, 219-232, Project Muse) AMB]

 History, as we know it, both from documentary evidence and the best historians, is choc-a-bloc with conspiracies. Thus if conspiracy theories are theories that [End Page 224] posit conspiracies, then to accept the conventional wisdom and adopt the principle that we ought not believe or investigate conspiracy theories would lead to the conclusion that history is bunk, that much of what we thought we knew is not only unbelievable, but not worth investigating. Much of recorded history would dissolve into a blur of inexplicable events, indeed events we should not even try to explicate. To adopt this principle would be to commit historical suicide or at least self-mutilation, to make large chunks of history unbelievable and hence unknowable, since knowledge requires belief. It would maim, if not destroy, history as an intellectual discipline. But it is not rational to adopt an epistemic principle with such catastrophic consequences. Therefore it is not rational to suppose that we should not believe or even investigate conspiracy theories. Perhaps it is worth stressing how catastrophic this principle would be, if consistently practiced. (In fact nobody does this; rather people like Blair apply it in a haphazard way when it happens to suit their political purposes.) We would be entitled to believe that large quantities of gunpowder were discovered in the cellars of Parliament in 1605, but not that Guy Fawkes and his confederates put it there, for that would be a conspiracy theory. We could accept that Lord Darnley died, but not that anybody killed him, since all the available explanations are conspiracy theories. We could accept that the "Rightist-Trotskyite Bloc" was put on trial in 1938, but we could not allow ourselves to believe that they were either guilty or innocent, since both beliefs entail a conspiracy. (If they were guilty then there was a treasonable conspiracy of spies and wreckers at the heart of the Soviet State. If they were innocent, there was a tyrannical conspiracy on the part of Stalin and others to fabricate the appearance of conspiracy.) We could notice that a lot of communists were massacred in China in 1927, but we could not rationally suppose that Chiang had conspired to kill them, for that would be a conspiracy theory. We could accept that World War II took place, but not that the Nazis conspired to wage it since that would be a conspiracy theory. (Good news for some of the Nuremburg defendants!) We could accept that the Holocaust occurred but not that anyone, Hitler included, conspired to bring it about. Moreover, we would not even be allowed to investigate these questions, since any answer we came up with would be something we were not entitled to believe. If the conventional wisdom is correct, and we ought not to believe conspiracy theories, then history is bunk, since it is largely unbelievable, the kind of thing that we are rationally required not to believe. But history is not bunk. Much of it merits belief, and that includes the many conspiracy theories of which we have ample evidence. Thus the conventional wisdom is wrong and conspiracy theories need not be rejected simply because they are conspiracy theories.

#### Epistemology disad—kill rational epistemology and politics, encourages human rights abuses and terrorism

Pigden 7 [professor of philosophy at the University of Otago, New Zealand and is the editor of Russell on Ethics (2007, Charles, “Conspiracy Theories and the Conventional Wisdom”, Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 4.2, 219-232, Project Muse) AMB

 Most political crimes, from disappearances and illegal bombing campaigns down to breaking peaceniks' noses or burglarizing the campaign headquarters of [End Page 225] the opposition party,9 are the products of conspiracy. Thus if conspiracy theories are theories that posit conspiracies, then if we adopted the principle that we should not believe and should not investigate conspiracy theories, we could not hold anyone responsible for such crimes. For to do so would be to accept some conspiracy theory or other. This would be an epistemic disaster, since our understanding of the political scene would dissolve in a mist of skepticism broken by islands of obvious fact. We could believe in the dead bodies but not that anyone had conspired to kill them; believe in the missing money, but not in the felonious theft. And it would a political disaster, since it would confer immunity on political criminals of all sorts, from the perpetrators of genocide down to bribe-taking congressmen. We could not punish people for crimes that we were not entitled to believe in or investigate. Thus it would be both politically and epistemically irrational to adopt the strategy of not believing in and not investigating conspiracy theories. So the conventional wisdom is wrong, and it is not the case that we ought not to believe and ought not to investigate such theories. When it comes to conspiracy theories, we are within our rights as rational beings not only to investigate them, but actually to believe in them, if that is what the evidence suggests. Again it is worth stressing just how catastrophic the strategy of conspiratorial skepticism would be if we applied it consistently, rather than using it from time to time to get out of political difficulties or to rubbish allegations that we find inconvenient. To begin with, the political world would be largely unintelligible. We would be officially debarred from understanding coups, or the crimes of terrorists as intentional actions, since in both cases the intentions behind the overt acts are formulated in secret. Hence they cannot be understood as intentional acts without resorting to conspiracy. We could all acknowledge that the bombs had gone off, but we could not suppose that someone had planted them, since that would be a conspiracy theory. We could accept that two planes had hit the Twin Towers, but we could not allow ourselves to suppose they had been hijacked and deliberately crashed, since that could not have happened without a conspiracy. The nightly news would be bobbing with islands of unintelligibility, since we would be officially debarred from understanding any action involving secret plans. (I defy anyone to make sense of recent events in Iraq without taking account of the orgy of plotting that undoubtedly goes on. Death squads don't advertise their plans, neither do guerillas, gangsters, terrorists or devious politicians.) We would be allowed to understand natural phenomena and open actions, openly arrived at. And we might even treat ourselves to unintended consequences provided these did not involve secret plotting. But we would be officially blind to covert actions and secret plans. This would not quite be epistemic suicide, since there are some events within the political sphere that we would be allowed to understand. But to adopt the strategy of conspiratorial skepticism would be the epistemic equivalent of self-mutilation and hence not a rational thing to do. But epistemically disastrous as conspiratorial skepticism would be, its political consequences would be catastrophic. For when it comes to conspiracy we would [End Page 226] be both officially blind and officially incurious. Under this regime, Woodward and Bernstein would not have been allowed to investigate Watergate, and even if they had, nobody would have been rationally entitled to believe their results. Nixon would have gotten away with his crimes. For if conspiracy theories were taboo, there could be no question of impeaching the President for "high crimes and misdemeanors", since most of those high crimes and misdemeanors were planned and executed in secret. The career of an investigative journalist like Seymour Hersh would stand condemned as one long exercise in irrationality since investigative journalism largely consists of investigating conspiracies and exposing them to the public gaze. If it is irrational to check out conspiracy theories, then the investigative part is a crime against reason, and if it is irrational to believe them, then the journalistic part is a crime against reason too, since it often consists in writing up conspiracy theories so as to encourage belief in the reader. One of the biggest problems with human rights abuses is impunity. Because the goons and their masters can usually get away with murder or worse,10 they have no compelling reason to cease and desist. But since most human rights abuses are the products of conspiracy, if we adopted the strategy of neither investigating nor believing conspiracy theories, impunity would become rationally sacrosanct. We could not investigate human rights abuses since, for the most part, this involves investigating conspiracy theories, and even if we could, we could not condemn their perpetrators, since to do that we would have to accept a conspiracy theory. Conspiratorial skepticism would provide the torturers and killers with a charter of impunity since it would become an epistemic no-no to shine a light into the dark places where they commit their crimes. Terrorists too would be immune from investigation, let alone conviction, since their crimes are usually planned in secret. More generally, it is a platitude of liberal democracy that the price of liberty is eternal vigilance. At least part of what this means is that we must beware of power-hungry politicians conspiring to deprive us of our liberties. But if we were not allowed to investigate conspiracy theories then our vigilance would be confined to the public actions of politicians rather than their secret plans. We would have become officially blind to some of the most serious threats to liberty. And even if we somehow discovered such a conspiracy we would not be allowed to act on that discovery, since we could not act on a theory we had debarred ourselves from believing. According to Edmund Burke, "There is no safety for honest men except by believing all possible evil of evil men." But if the conventional wisdom is correct, we should not believe in the evil of evil men unless that evil is out in the open! Thus if you hate the freedoms of a democratic society, you should cultivate the opinion that conspiracy theories are unbelievable. Conversely, if you want to strike a blow for liberty (or if you want to be able to see the threats to liberty in order to be capable of striking a blow for it), this is a thesis you that should reject. [End Page 227]

#### Real violence disad--Impacts outside of epistemology, you are complacent with the worst forms of state violence

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 The absolute version of this strategy would be less bizarre but more catastrophic: less bizarre because what is rational to believe would not vary from place to place; more catastrophic because it would debar us from believing in evil conspiracies on the part of governments anywhere if those theories were inconsistent with some official view. Bad news for Amnesty International, bad news for their clients the world over as they are imprisoned, beaten, murdered and tortured, since you can't write letters on behalf of people whose problems you are not allowed to believe in. But I need not spill any more ink denouncing a strategy that nobody seriously advocates. For the concept of a conspiracy theory as it is commonly employed is a chauvinist construct. It is not to be understood in terms of governments generally, but in terms of Western governments, and recent Western governments at that. When people say or imply that conspiracy theories ought not to be believed, what they actually mean (in so far as they have a coherent idea) is that we should not believe theories that postulate evil schemes on the part of recent or contemporary Western governments (or government agencies) and that run counter to the current orthodoxy in the relevant Western countries. Thus you can believe that Saddam had successfully conspired to acquire nuclear weapons since the chief conspirator in this particular drama was not a member of a Western government. And you can believe that members of the Reagan administration conspired to evade the Boland Amendment by selling arms to Iran to finance the [End Page 229] Contras, since the existence of this conspiracy is currently consistent with received opinion. But you must not believe that Bush considered bombing Al Jazeera (let alone that the earlier bombings of Al Jazeera offices were intentional) for that theory involves evil schemes on the part of a Western leader and contradicts the official view. Is this a sensible belief-forming strategy? Obviously not. An epistemic strategy should maximize the chances of truth and minimize the chances of error. But if this strategy had been pursued in the past, many politically important truths would never have come to light. For there are many theories that are not conspiracy theories now, though they were conspiracy theories in the past: the theory that the Kennedy administration conspired to overthrow Diem, the theory that CREEP conspired to burglarize the Democratic headquarters in the Watergate building, the theory that members of the Reagan administration conspired to sell weapons to Iran in order to fund the Contras.12 All these theories were once inconsistent with official opinion, though nowadays official opinion has managed to catch up with the facts. Thus it would have been an epistemic mistake to have adopted this strategy in the past. More importantly, it would have been a political mistake. If these activities had gone unnoticed, there would have been no check on the abuse of Presidential power, which would probably have gone on to worse excesses. The price of liberty is eternal vigilance. The revised strategy would have sent us to sleep. Thus the conventional wisdom has proved to be unwise. On any of the readings of "conspiracy theory" that I have been able to come up with, it is not the case that we should neither believe nor investigate conspiracy theories. If you wish to vindicate the conventional wisdom, you must do two things. First you must give an interpretation of the term "conspiracy theory" with roughly the right extension. (Most of the theories castigated as "conspiracy theories" must qualify as such, and most of the conspiracy-postulating theories that conspiracy skeptics believe in must not.) You must then show that on this interpretation, the strategy of neither investigating nor believing in conspiracies makes epistemic sense. Until this is done, the idea that conspiracy theories as such are intellectually suspect is a superstition that can be safely dismissed.

### Framework

#### Our counterinterpretation is to understand the United States Federal Government as the relations of domination that make possible American white supremacy—only accounting for the power relations of everyday life captures the totality of the state’s presence.

Rodriguez 2010 (Dylan, Prof. Ethnic Studies at UC-Riverside, “The Terms of Engagement: Warfare, White Locality, and Abolition,” Critical Sociology 2010 36: 151)CJQ

‘The state’ is fundamentally a conceptual term that refers to a mind-boggling array of geographic, political, and institutional relations of power and domination. It is a term of abstraction: certainly the state is ‘real’, but it is so massive and institutionally stretched that it simply cannot be understood and ‘seen’ in its totality. Thus, the way a given public comes come to comprehend the state’s realness – or more accurately, the way the state makes itself comprehensible, intelligible, and materially identifiable to ordinary people – is through its own self-narrations and institutional mobilizations. By way of example, consider the narrative and institutional dimensions of the ‘war on drugs’ during its most heightened period of political currency: New York City mayor Edward Koch, in a gesture of masculine challenge to the Reagan-era federal government, offers a prime example of such a narration in a 1986 op-ed piece published in the pages of The New York Times: I propose the following steps as a coordinated Federal response to [the war on drugs]: Use the full resources of the military for drug interdiction. The Posse Comitatus doctrine, which restricts participation of the military in civilian law enforcement, must be modified so that the military can be used for narcotics control … Enact a Federal death penalty for drug wholesalers. Life sentences, harsh fines, forfeitures of assets, billions spent on education and therapy all have failed to deter the drug wholesaler. The death penalty would. Capital punishment is an extraordinary remedy, but we are facing an extraordinary peril … Designate United States narcotics prisons. The Bureau of Prisons should designate separate facilities for drug offenders. Segregating such prisoners from others, preferably in remote locations such as the Yukon or desert areas, might motivate drug offenders to abandon their trade. Enhance the Federal agencies combating the drug problem. The Attorney General should greatly increase the number of drug enforcement agents in New York and other cities. He should direct the Federal Bureau of Investigation to devote substantial manpower against the cocaine trade and should see to it that the Immigration and Naturalization Service is capable of detecting and deporting aliens convicted of drug crimes in far better numbers than it now does. Enact the state and local narcotics control assistance act of 1986. This bill provides $750 million annually for five years to assist state and local jurisdictions increase their capacities for enforcement, corrections, education and prosecution. Rodríguez: The Terms of Engagement 163 These proposals offer no certainty for success in the fight against drugs, of course. If we are to succeed, however, it is essential that we persuade the Federal Government to recognize its responsibility to lead the way. (Koch 1986, emphasis added) Koch’s manifesto builds a mechanism of self-legitimating violence: the state (here momentarily manifest in the person of the New York City mayor) constantly tells stories about itself, facilitated by a politically willing corporate media. This storytelling – which through repetition and saturation assembles the popular ‘common sense’ of domestic warfare – is inseparable from the on-the-ground shifting, rearranging, and recommitting of resources and institutional power that we witness in the everyday mobilizations of a state waging intense, localized, militarized struggle against its declared internal enemies, structurally embodied in the nationalist animus that epidermally 3 (Fanon 1967) criminalizes black and indigenous populations and distends into localized racist state violence waged on differently racially and ethnically pathologized brown populations, from Puerto Ricans and Filipinos to Mexicans and Iranians. Consider, for example, how pronouncements like Koch’s are consistently accompanied by the operational innovation of different varieties of covert ops, urban guerilla war, and counterintelligence warfare that specifically emerge through the state’s declared domestic wars on crime/drugs/gangs/etc. (Parenti 2000) Hence, it is no coincidence that Mayor Koch’s editorial makes the stunning appeal to withdraw (‘modify’) the Posse Comitatus principle (tantamount to a call for martial law), in order to facilitate the federal government’s formal mobilization of its global war apparatus for battle in the domestic urban theater of the war on drugs.

#### The colon does not merely represent a pause in a sentence like a coma, nor unify two things like a hyphen—it signifies the radical immanence of the terms in question—means colon creates a disconnect between resolved and the resolution

Agamben 2001 (Giorgio, Prof. Phil at European Graduate School, “Absolute Immanence” in *Introduction to the Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze* Pp. 153-154)CJQ

In treatises on punctuation, the function of the colon is generally defined in terms of an intersection of two parameters: a pause value (stronger than the semicolon and less than the period) and a semantic value, which marks the indissoluble relation between two meanings, each of which is in itself partially complete. In the series that goes from the equals sign (identity of meaning) to the hyphen (the dialectic of unity and separation), the colon thus occupies an intermediary function. Deleuze could have written 'Immanence Is a Life', or 'Immanence and a Life' (in the sense in which 'and' takes the place of 'is' to create an agencement) and, furthermore (according to the principle underlined by J. H. Masmejan6 that only a comma can take the place of a colon): 'Immanence, A Life'. Deleuze instead used a colon, clearly because he had in mind neither a simple identity nor a simple logical connection. (When Deleuze writes in the text, 'one can say of pure immanence that it is A LIFE, and nothing else', it suffices to recall the title's colon to exclude the possibility that he intends an identity between 'immanence' and 'a life'.) The colon introduces something more than an agencement between immanence and a life; it introduces an agencement of a special kind, something like an absolute agencement that also includes 'non-relation', or the relation derived from non-relation of which Deleuze speaks in his discussion of the relationship to the Outside in his book on Foucault. If we take up Adorno's metaphor of the colon as a green light in the traffic of language — the aptness of which is verified by punctuation treatises, which classify the colon among 'opening' marks — we can then say that between immanence and a life there is a kind of crossing with neither distance nor identification, something like a passage without spatial movement. In this sense, the colon represents the dislocation of immanence in itself, the opening to an alterity that nevertheless remains absolutely immanent: that is, the movement that Deleuze, playing on Neoplatonic emanation, calls immanation

#### Cede the political disad—Your interpretation valorizing Instrumental debate alienates citizens from the political sphere ensuring biopolitical control.

Jessica J. Kulynych, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Winthrop University, Winter 1997, “Performing Politics: Foucault, Habermas, and Postmodern Participation,” Polity, Vol. 30 No. 2, pg 315. //uo-tjs

Political scientists have traditionally understood political participation as an activity that assures individual influence over the political system, protection of private interests, system legitimacy, and perhaps even self-development. Habermas and Foucault describe the impact of the conditions of postmodernity on the possibility for efficacious political action in remarkably similar ways. Habermas describes a world where the possibilities for efficacious political action are quite limited. The escalating interdependence of state and economy, the expansive increase in bureaucratization, the increasingly technical nature of political decisionmaking, and the subsequent colonization of a formerly sacred private sphere by a ubiquitous administrative state render traditional modes of political participation unable to provide influence, privacy, legitimacy, and self-development.(3) As the state is forced to take an ever larger role in directing a complex global, capitalist, welfare state economy, the scope of administration inevitably grows. In order to fulfill its function as the manager of the economy, the administrative state must also manage the details of our lives formerly considered private. Yet, as the state's role in our "private" lives continues to grow, the public has become less and less interested in government, focusing instead on personal and social mores, leisure, and consumption. Ironically, we have become less interested in politics at precisely the same moment when our lives are becoming increasingly "politicized" and administered. This siege of private life and the complicity of this ideology of "civil privatism" in the functioning of the modern administrative state makes a mockery of the idea that there exist private interests that can be protected from state intervention.(4) Correlatively, the technical and instrumental rationality of modern policymaking significantly lessens the possibility for public influence on state policy.(5) The difficulty of participation in Habermas's world is exacerbated by the added complexity of a political system structured by hierarchical gender and racial norms. Nancy Fraser uses Habermas's analysis of the contemporary situation to demonstrate how the infusion of these hierarchical gender and racial norms into the functioning of the state and economy ensures that political channels of communication between citizens and the state are unequally structured and therefore cannot function as mechanisms for the equal protection of interests.(6) Accordingly, theorists are much less [not] optimistic about the possibilities for citizens to acquire or develop feelings of autonomy and efficacy from the attempt to communicate[ing] interests to a system that is essentially impervious to citizen interests, eschews discussion of long-term goals, and requires exclusively technical and instrumental debate. Similarly, Foucault's complex genealogical descriptions of disciplinary power networks challenge the traditional assumption that political power is located primarily in the formal apparatus of the state. The traditional understanding of political participation tells us nothing about what types of political action are appropriate in a world where power is typically and predominantly disciplinary, productive, and normalizing. As long as we define the purpose of participation only in terms of influence, privacy, legitimacy, and self-development, we will be unable to see how political action can be effective in the contemporary world.

#### Desire for “fairness” presupposes a liberal division between legitimate and off-limits exercises of freedom. The a-priori individuation behind fairness and equality becomes homogenizing, exclusionary, and fascist.

Foucault ’77 Michel Foucault, preface to Anti-Oedipus, Penguin: London, 1977, p. xl-xiv

During the years 1945-1965 (I am referring to Europe), there was a certain way of thinking correctly, a certain style of political discourse, a certain ethics of the intellectual. One had to be on familiar terms with Marx, not let one's dreams stray too far from Freud. And one had to treat sign-systems-the signifier-with the greatest respect. These were the three requirements that made the strange occupation of writing and speaking a measure of truth about oneself and one's time acceptable. Then came the five brief, impassioned, jubilant, enigmatic years. At the gates of our world, there was Vietnam, of course, and the first major blow to the powers that be. But here, inside our walls, what exactly was taking place? An amalgam of revolutionary and anti-repressive politics? A war fought on two fronts: against social exploitation and psychic repression? A surge of libido modulated by the class struggle? Perhaps. At any rate, it is this familiar, dualistic interpretation that has laid claim to the events of those years. The dream that cast its spell, between the First World War and fascism, over the dreamiest parts of Europe-the Germany of Wilhelm Reich, and the France of the surrealists-had returned and set fire to reality itself: Marx and Freud in the same incandescent light. But is that really what happened? Had the utopian project of the thirties been resumed, this time on the scale of historical practice? Or was there, on the contrary, a movement toward political struggles that no longer conformed to the model that Marxist tradition had prescribed? Toward an experience and a technology of desire that were no longer Freudian. It is true that the old banners were raised, but the combat shifted and spread into new zones. Anti-Oedipus shows first of all how much ground has been covered. But it does much more than that. It wastes no time in discrediting the old idols, even though it does have a great deal of fun with Freud. Most important, it motivates us to go further. It would be a mistake to read Anti-Oedipus as the new theoretical reference (you know, that much-heralded theory that finally encompasses everything, that finally totalizes and reassures, the one we are told we "need so badly" in our age of dispersion and specialization where "hope" is lacking). One must not look for a "philosophy" amid the extraordinary profusion of new notions and surprise concepts: Anti-Oedipus is not a flashy Hegel. I think that Anti-Oedipus can best be read as an "art," in the sense that is conveyed by the term "erotic art," for example. Informed by the seemingly abstract notions of multiplicities, flows, arrangements, and connections, the analysis of the relationship of desire to reality and to the capitalist "machine" yields answers to concrete questions. Questions that are less concerned with why this or that than with how to proceed. How does one introduce desire into thought, into discourse, into action? How can and must desire deploy its forces within the political domain and grow more intense in the process of overturning the established order? Ars erotica, ars theoretica, ars politica. Whence the three adversaries confronted by Anti-Oedipus. Three adversaries who do not have the same strength, who represent varying degrees of danger, and whom the book combats in different ways: 1. The political ascetics, the sad militants, the terrorists of theory, those who would preserve the pure order of politics and political discourse. Bureaucrats of the revolution and civil servants of Truth. 2. The poor technicians of desire-psychoanalysts and semiologists of every sign and symptom-who would subjugate the multiplicity of desire to the twofold law of structure and lack. 3. Last but not least, the major enemy, the strategic adversary is fascism (whereas Anti-Oedipus' opposition to the others is more of a tactical engagement). And not only historical fascism, the fascism of Hitler and Mussolini - which was able to mobilize and use the desire of the masses so effectively - but also the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behavior, the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us. I would say that Anti-Oedipus (may its authors forgive me) is a book of ethics, the first book of ethics to be written in France in quite a long time (perhaps that explains why its success was not limited to a particular "readership" : being anti-oedipal has become a life style, a way of thinking and living). How does one keep from being fascist, even (especially) when one believes oneself to be a revolutionary militant? How do we rid our speech and our acts, our hearts and our pleasures, of fascism? How do we ferret out the fascism that is ingrained in our behavior? The Christian moralists sought out the traces of the flesh lodged deep within the soul. Deleuze and Guattari, for their part, pursue the slightest traces of fascism in the body. Paying a modest tribute to Saint Francis de Sales, \* one might say that Anti-Oedipus is an Introduction to the Non-Fascist Life. This art of living counter to all forms of fascism, whether already present or impending, carries with it a certain number of essential principles which I would summarize as follows if I were to make this great book into a manual or guide to everyday life: Free political action from all unitary and totalizing ~~paranoia~~ fear and irrationality. Develop action, thought, and desires by proliferation, juxtaposition, and disjunction, and not by subdivision and pyramidal hierarchization. Withdraw allegiance from the old categories of the Negative (law, limit, castration, lack, lacuna), which Western thought has so long held sacred as a form of power and an access to reality. Prefer what is positive and multiple, difference over uniformity, flows over unities, mobile arrangements over systems. Believe that what is productive is not sedentary but nomadic. Do not think that one has to be sad in order to be militant, even though the thing one is fighting is abominable. It is the connection of desire to reality (and not its retreat into the forms of representation) that possesses revolutionary force. Do not use thought to ground a political practice in Truth; nor political action to discredit, as mere speculation, a line of thought. Use political practice as an intensifier of thought, and analysis as a multiplier of the forms and domains for the intervention of political action. Do not demand of politics that it restore the "rights" of the individual, as philosophy has defined them. The individual is the product of power. What is needed is to "de-individualize" by means of multiplication and displacement, diverse combinations. The group must not be the organic bond uniting hierarchized individuals, but a constant generator of de-individualization. Do not become enamored of power.

#### And our framework is necessary to counter apathetic and docile citizenry

Jessica J. Kulynych, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Winthrop University, Winter 1997, “Performing Politics: Foucault, Habermas, and Postmodern Participation,” Polity, Vol. 30 No. 2, pg 315

Such a concept of political participation allows us to see action where it was previously invisible. So where Gaventa, in his famous study of Appalachian miners, sees quiescence in "anger [that is] poignantly expressed about the loss of homeplace, the contamination of streams, the drain of wealth, or the destruction from the strip mining all around... [but is only] individually expressed and shows little apparent translation into organized protest or collective action,"'(73) a concept of performative resistance sees tactics and strategies that resist not only the global strategies of economic domination, but also the construction of apathetic, quiescent citizens. When power is such that it can create quiescence, then the definition of political participation must include those forms of political action that disrupt and counter quiescence. A concept of political participation that recognizes participation in sporadically expressed grievances, and an "adherence to traditional values" by citizens faced with the "penetration of dominant social values," is capable of seeing not only how power precludes action but also how power relationships are "not altogether successful in shaping universal acquiescence."(74)